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This paper seeks to identify the dierences in income sources between East and
West Germany and their relative importance over the lifecycle by applying the Na-
tional Transfer Accounts methodology. In our analysis we make use of the almost
unique historical setting the previously divided country provides to study how dif-
fering institutional arrangements shape the economic lifecycle. For the younger age
groups, we nd dierences between East and West. These dierences are mainly due
to the high public consumption per capita in the East, as estimates of private con-
sumption do not show a large degree of variation between the two regions. Our results
further show that the income sources dier the most among the elderly, as the East
Germans who lived under socialism, did not accumulate assets, and relied entirely on
public pensions. Nevertheless, an increase in asset income could be observed in recent
decades.
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Konrad-Zuse-Str. 1, 18057 Rostock, Germany
Email: kluge@demogr.mpg.de, Phone 0049-381-2081-210.
11 Introduction
Over the course of their lives, individuals experience remarkably long periods of depen-
dency (when consumption exceeds production) during childhood and old age (Lee et al.,
2006). Consumption during the two dependent stages that occur at the beginning and the
end of life must to be nanced by alternative sources, such as private or public transfers
or assets. The monetary ows needed to nance this dependency are large, with intergen-
erational transfers amounting to about one-half of national income (Mason, 2005). The
alternative means of nancing consumption over the lifecycle, the ratio of public to private
transfers, and the role played by assets in nancing retirement for the elderly, are issues of
great concern to policy makers. This is especially true for countries where public pensions
play a prominent role as an income source for the elderly, and the aging of the population
calls into question the sustainability of the existing social security transfer channels. In
the context of the aging German welfare state it is crucial for us to gain a to better under-
standing of the dierences in the transfer mechanisms between East and West, as these
transfers represent a signicant reallocation of resources, not only by age groups, but also
across regions.
As a result of historical events1, the two parts og Germany experienced virtually op-
posite political and socio-economic environments. Over a period of 40 years, while West
Germany was developing a functioning market economy, the socialist ideology in the East
prevented a signicant dierentiation in wages (Franz and Steiner, 2000). For the elderly,
the pension system in the East provided public pensions that were nearly equal in size.
Moreover, the egalitarian system in the East did not produce a large number of home-
owners, nor luxury goods to invest where available. Because saving for retirement2 was
not necessary, and there were no incentives to save, most GDR citizens did not accumulate
assets. Although the public pension system in the West was granting generous public pen-
sions, and these pensions crowded out savings to an extent, West Germans nearly always
sought to accumulate assets as well.3 Today, in the wake of the most recent pension re-
forms, German citizens are witnessing cutbacks in the public pension system. Due to these
reductions, the need to boost savings rates for retirement will become increasingly urgent
in the near future. Because of the diering amounts of time they had to participate in the
market economy, pensioners in the two parts of the country began to plan for retirement
under very dierent conditions. In this study , we will try to quantify this variation.
Many previous studies have compared the economic and social conditions, or the de-
grees of transfer dependency, in the East and the West. Gender role dierences aect
1After the Second World War Germany, was divided into an eastern part under Soviet authority, and
a western part governed by the Western Allies over a period of 40 years.
2See Modigliani and Brumberg (1954); Feldstein (1976); Modigliani (1986).
3The mean amount of capital that was bequeathed in 2002 was more than four times higher for an
individual from the West than from the East (Kohli et al., 2006b).
2labor market issues even today. The East German government expected, and needed, to
have both men and women participating in the labor force: whereas in West Germany's
socially conservative welfare state, it was understood that women would perform unpaid
domestic labor, while the men became the breadwinners (Rosenfeld et al., 2004, p. 104).
This meant that there was greater gender equality in the East German labor market, with
high levels of female employment4 and long working hours even for mothers [ibid.]. In ad-
dition, the lower wages meant that most families needed two incomes (Nickel, 2003). The
restructuring of individual lives that took place after reunication yielded a high number
of jobseekers who could not nd suitable positions in the new labor market. Although
additional o-the-job training was oered, the situation remained serious (Lechner, 1999).
The severity of the restructuring the labor market, and its eects on individuals, were im-
mense. One out of three workers, or about three million people, lost their jobs after 1989
(Dornbusch et al., 1992, p. 239). The large shifts into new positions or unemployment
resulted in a sharp drop in female labor force participation and high unemployment rates
in the East (Figure 1). Income dierences persisted even after reunication as can be
seen in the National Accounts (for 2003, the compensation of employees per capita in the
East only reached 75 percent of Western levels) and were due in part to the lower levels
of productivity in the former GDR, which have been well-documented (Burda and Hunt,
2001; Akerlof et al., 1991; Barrell and Te Velde, 2000). Nevertheless, wages in the East
increased substantially at the beginning of the 1990s, as did the wage inequality (Franz
and Steiner, 2000).
The direct transfer of resources from the West to the East for infrastructure improve-
ments is a subject that has been studied extensively. The "German Reunication" fund
redistributed 160.7 billion German marks to the East between 1990 and 1994 (Wagner,
2001)5. Subsequently, the new L ander were included in the nancial equalization scheme
between the federal government and the L ander. During the period 1995 - 2005 (Soli-
darpakt I) about 204 billion (20 billion annually) euros were transferred to the East in
an eort to bring the Eastern infrastructure up to Western levels (Wagner, 2001, p. 46).
The amount transferred to the Eastern region exceeded ve percent of West German
GDP (Raelh uschen and Walliser, 1999, p. 277). The solidarity surcharge, additional
payments of the scal equalization fund (L andernanzausgleich), and federal supplement
grants (Bundeserg anzungsabgabe) still play important roles in the scal budgets of local
governments in the East. The "Solidarpakt II", which was established in 2005, seamlessly
followed the earlier one, and will operate until 2019. According to Seitz (2006, p. 29), the
direct transfers to the East currently amount to 10 billion euros each year, and will grad-
4In 1989, the female labor force participation rate was 89 percent in the East and only 56 percent in
the West (Rosenfeld et al., 2004, p. 111).
5The transfers to the East amounted to 18 percent of GDP if Berlin is included: if Berlin is not included
the share rises to 26 percent of GDP.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate
Source: Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit 2010
ually taper o until they reach three billion euros in 2019, after which the "Solidarpakt
II" will expire.
In addition to these direct monetary transfers, transfers via the social security system,
especially pensions, owed from West to East. The East German system granted retire-
ment benets which were neither tied to the level of income, nor to the duration or size of
contributions. A unitary monthly amount was distributed to the individual based on the
number of years the person spent in employment, with amounts ranging from a basic pro-
vision (330 eastern German Marks) to a maximum of 470 eastern German Marks (Steen,
2002). After reunication the conversion of East German pensions was very generous and
the values for the East were multiplied by an annual factor that resulted in pensioners
in the East receiving approximately the same amounts as pensioners in the West, despite
the fact that wages and pensions were much lower in the GDR. Indeed due to high labor
force participation rates of women (Sinn, 2002) and long working histories, East Germans
had higher per capita pension values than their West German counterparts. In 2003, the
social security budget in the East witnessed a shortfall of 60 billion euros. The high per
capita pension values are expected to decrease when the younger cohorts enter retirement
age as they experienced severe disruptions in their working histories.
This paper seeks to identify the dierences in income sources between East and West
Germany and their relative importance over the lifecycle. To answer this question we
will make use of the National Transfer Account (NTA) methodology, which builds upon
4the work of Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965), Willis (1988), Lee (1994), and Bommier
and Lee (2003). The NTA methodology allows us to investigate dierences in the com-
plete individual economic lifecycle, as well as transfer patterns between East and West.
This approach should enable us to deepen our understanding about how institutional ar-
rangements aect the proles. We will examine the dierences in the individual economic
lifecycle of East and West Germans, including dierences in private and public transfers,
labor income, and asset-based reallocations. While a number of other studies have looked
at various aspects of the lifecycle and dierences between East and West, this paper takes
a more inclusive approach, rather than focusing on only one part of the story. We take
into account all the possible agents such as families, the state or NPISH's and relate the
micro behavior of these agents to nationally representative macro controls.6 By taking
this approach, we are able to consistently capture all the important variables aecting
each individual agent over his lifecycle in a cross-sectional setting.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will present the materials
and methods used to estimate the lifecycle dierences in East and West Germany. Section
3 will present the results for the three main stages of life - children, prime age adults and
the elderly - for the two regions of interest. The consequences of population aging for the
public transfer system in Germany will be the subject of the fourth section, and the nal
section will consist of a brief summary.
2 Materials and Methods
The estimates are based on National Accounts and population data, both provided by
the Federal Statistical Oce (FSO) and the German Income and Expenditure Survey
(Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, or EVS). Macro control totals are provided by
the statistical oces of the German L ander (Statistische  Amter der L ander, 2008).7 The
macro control totals are used as an anchor to adjust the micro proles to t National
Accounts estimates. Table 1 provides the numbers used for estimation. Total public
consumption gures for East and West Germany are available in the National Accounts.
Unfortunately, a problem arises because the estimates for education, health and \other"
are unavailable in greater detail. Therefore, the shares found at the national level were
assumed to hold in both regions.
The population estimates are available in one-year age groups provided by the German
6For all variables of interest, the micro foundation comes from the Income and Expenditure survey,
and the adjustment is based on the macro controls from the National Accounts, and is thus nationally
representative.
7This is a joint publication of the 16 statistical oces of the German L ander, the Federal Statistical
Oce and the B urgeramt, Statistik und Wahlen, Frankfurt a. M. The statistical oces of the 16 L ander
report their numbers in a manner that allows us to separate the main economic indicators for East and
West.
5Table 1: The macro controls for East and West Germany 2003 in billion euros and per
capita values
Aggregate Per Capita
West East West East
Population 65 618 912 16 912 759
Labor income 1043.62 202.27 15 904 11 959
Earnings income 957.56 189.27 14 592 11 191
Self-employment income 86.06 12.99 1 311 768
Public consumption 327.42 89.42 4 989 5 287
Public education consumption 51.53 14.07 785 831
Public health consumption 107.07 29.24 1 631 1 728
Public other consumption 168.82 46.11 2 572 2 726
Private consumption 905.88 188.31 13 805 11 134
Private education consumption 1.51 8.15 124 89
Private health consumption 5.08 37.14 566 300
Private housing consumption 6.01 39.80 606 355
Private durables consumption 18.44 81.45 1 241 1 090
Private other consumption 157.27 739.33 11 267 9 299
Public cash transfer inows 348.72 106.72 5 314 6 310
Old age pensions 209.85 61.17 3 198 3 616
Unemployment/social benets 53.33 23.28 812 1 376
Other social security 55.84 15.30 1 303 3 301
Outows on labor 551.72 103.11 8 407 6 096
Income and property taxes 184.45 24.06 2 810 1 422
Social contributions 367.27 79.05 5 596 4 674
Outows (NTA Classication) 667.65 128.34 10 174 7 588
Taxes on consumption 130.81 27.19 1 993 1 607
Taxes on labor 445.86 88.13 6 794 5 211
Taxes on assets 90.97 13.02 1 386 769
Source: VGR der L ander, author's own calculations
6Federal Statistical Oce, and are based on an extrapolation of census data. The last census
conducted in the former Federal Republic of Germany was in 1987, and the nal census
in the former German Democratic Republic was carried out in 1981. In addition to this
data, we also used publications of the Ministry of Health and Education in cases in which
the National Accounts and FSO statistics do not provide sucient information.
The microlevel survey data were obtained from the EVS of 2003. The EVS is con-
ducted every ve years by the FSO, and is based on a representative quota sample of
Germany's private households. The EVS includes a detailed account of income by source,
consumption by type, saving ows, and asset stocks by portfolio category. The EVS
of 2003 includes around 50,000 households made up of some 127,000 individuals. The
waves from 1993 onward include not only data from the former Federal Republic, but also
a sample from the former German Democratic Republic. The survey is representative of
households with a monthly net income of less than 18,000 euros. The EVS does not include
very wealthy households (70,000 of 38.1 million households), persons with no permanent
residence, or the institutionalized population. (For a methodological overview, see Statis-
tisches Bundesamt (2005). For three months, participating households kept a detailed
book of household accounts that covered every kind of potential income and expenditure.
The National Transfer Accounts methodology 8 will be used to construct the estimates.
The ow account identity is given by
Y l(a) + Y a(a) + +(a)
| {z }
Inflows




where Y l(a) is the labor income, Y a(a) is the asset income, and +(a) are the transfers
received at each corresponding age a. C(a), S(a), and  (a) are consumption, savings
and transfers paid at each age. The inows need to equal the outows on the aggregate
level of Germany. Rearranging the equation 1 leads to
C(a)   Y l(a)
| {z }
Lifecycle Decit





Net Transfers | {z }
Age Reallocations
(2)
(Mason et al., 2008). In the separate LCD estimates for East and West, we allow for ows
between the two parts of the country, with the East receiving subsidies, and beneting
from public expenditures in the form of public transfers, such as unemployment benets
and pensions.
A closer look at the reallocation mechanisms will enable us to determine to what
extent the lifecycle decit is nanced via public or private transfer channels for the people
8For further information see www.ntaccounts.org.
7aged 45 and above, to identify the leading institutions that reallocate between the age
groups, and to understand how these mechanisms work dierently in the East and in
the West. The age proles used to compute the NTA (e.g. for income, consumption,
public or private transfers, and asset income) are drawn from survey data, and are then
smoothed and adjusted to the corresponding macro control. Data on private consumption
of education and health is available at the household level, but when this data are needed
on the individual level, a method similar to the one developed by Attanasio et al. (1999)
is employed. All other forms of consumption are allocated based on an allocation rule
developed by Deaton and Paxson (1997). Our equivalence scale is more continuous, but is
similar (Lee et al., 2006). For public consumption the information needed can be obtained
from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health.
Due to the data format, Berlin is included entirely in the East proles.9 This adjust-
ment was necessary, as the macro numbers can only be obtained by including West Berlin
in the Eastern part of the country. Using the microsurvey presents no diculties as in
all of the 16 states, each household's place of residence is distinguishable; West Berlin is
simply coded as East. It should be noted that the variable identifying the region a person
lives in is the current region. People employed in the West may have originally come
from the former GDR. In order to evaluate how severe this might bias the estimates, the
income by age was compared using the current region from the EVS and the SOEP data,
and contrasted to income values applying the former region where the person lived before
reunication. The dierences were small, and hence no additional eorts were made to
further investigate the issue. The public transfer part was estimated directly from the
survey, and all the necessary in- and outows were drawn from the EVS, as before.
Private transfers had to be adjusted dierently. Estimates for inter-household transfers
caused additional problems. For all of Germany, they were estimated and balanced with
the private transfers to the rest of the world (ROW). When this setting is applied, the
inter-household inows needed to equal the inter-household outows, plus the balance
from ROW. In the case of the East-West estimates, we unfortunately do not know the
value of inter-household transfers crossing the former border. Nor do we have information
about the actors making or receiving transfers. Instead, we used the original estimates of
inter-household transfers for East and West. This allowed us to calculate the intra-family
transfers. Finally, we calculated the asset-based reallocations, including asset income and
savings information, as the residual.
918 percent of the eastern German population live in Berlin, and the city's GDP accounts for 23 percent
of total Eastern GDP.
83 Lifecycle Results for East and West Germany
National Transfer Accounts are designed to track all of the possible monetary inter-age
ows in an economy. It follows that the main driving forces of the proles are the extent to
which individuals pursue paid employment, receive public assistance, or invest in assets.
Figure 2 illustrates the main income sources in East and West Germany by age, 13 years
after the reunication. The \other social security prole" includes people who receive
unemployment benets, who are on on partial retirement (\Altersteilzeit") or who collect
basic social welfare payments. A relatively high percentage share of people aged 50 and
over in the East have left the labor market and must bridge the gap to pension income.
Twenty percent of the elderly receive unemployment benets, and another 10 percent
participate in partial retirement programs. The values are more than twice as high in the
East as in the West. Pensioners in the East live almost entirely on public pensions: they
have virtually no other income source. In the West, the corresponding percentage is only
80 percent, and a greater number of pensioners additionally accumulated assets. Using
the concept of the lifecycle decit, we hope to gain insight into how the dependent stages
of life, when consumption exceeds labor income, are nanced. The dierent roles played
by pensions and social security as income sources over the lifecycle suggests that there are
also diering patterns of nancing consumption in the East and West. Dierences that are
related to gender roles, the value assigned to unemployment benets, or the importance
of asset-based reallocations, are certainly reected in the accounts.
The nominal proles of the lifecycle decits for East and West are depicted in Figure
3. Consumption is decomposed into education, health, housing, durables, and \other":
where "other" is the dominant item, including food and rent for housing. The latter
accounts for 80 percent of private expenditures in both regions. The listed remaining
consumption items are less important. The shapes of the proles are therefore the same.
Younger people consume education, while the elderly consume health care. Nevertheless,
interesting dierences can be found. Per capita private education expenditures are twice
as high in the West as in the East, although the percentage share is low. The average
expenditures in East Germany are nearly equally distributed across all age groups from
ve to 25, while in the West, a tendency towards higher expenditures for secondary and
tertiary education can be observed. Health care expenditures are also twice as high in the
West as in the East, amounting to 650 euros for a 70-year old in the East, compared with
1,200 euros in the West. Similar dierences can be seen in the imputed rental values of
owner-occupied housing. While the discrepancy is not too large among 20-40 year olds,
the gap widens substantially from age 50 onwards. Only the share of durables consumed
in the East reaches 75 percent of Western values. Total private consumption for both
regions shows the double-hump-shaped pattern resulting from household economies of
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Figure 2: Income source by age, East and West 2003
Source: SOEP 2003
scale, though this pattern is less pronounced in the East. For the youngest ages, the gap
between total private expenditures in the East and in the West is narrow, and only adds
up to 1,000 euros. At the rst peak in expenditures, which occurs in the early thirties,
the gap widens to 3,000 euros. Meanwhile, the biggest gap can be seen between the 60-
year-olds in the two countries, with the dierence in expenditures per capita amounting to
4,500 euros. A study of these diverging consumption patterns was also conducted by Jenke
and Lebok (2009). They nd the eastern Germans to be more price sensitive than their
Western counterparts. Among higher earners, the gap closes. So the general picture is
therefore quite similar. Education and health care expenditures are low, and only housing
results in a higher per capita prole because of higher homeownership rates in the West.
If we look at the expenditures for luxury items, such as jewelry or eating out, we nd
that values for the West are about one-third higher than in the East. Nonetheless, the
dierences are much smaller for holiday expenditures, and East Germans even tend to
spend more, on average, than the West Germans on holidays.
Public consumption per capita is highest for school-age children and for the oldest
old. The adjustment of public consumption was made based on the shares of German
public consumption items in 2003, as detailed public consumption information cannot be
obtained at the sub-national level. The Eastern and Western macro control totals for
public consumption are used as an anchor. Far higher expenditures per capita for ed-
ucation, partly due to the dramatic decline in the TFR in the early 1990s, and partly



































Figure 3: The nominal lifecycle decit for East and West Germany in euro in 2003
Source: EVS 2003, National Accounts 2003, author's own calculations
because of large expenditures on education, are recorded in the East. In all of the East
German L ander, per capita spending on education exceeds ve percent of GDP (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt, 2007), which is considerably higher than in the West German L ander,
such as Bavaria (3.4 percent of GDP) and Baden-W urttemberg (3.8 percent of GDP).
This is all the more remarkable considering that a smaller proportion of the population
are of school-age. Public health expenditures are almost identical, and the dierence in
public consumption cannot be attributed to health. Other public consumption is allocated
equally, and also does not account for the higher nominal values in the East. The strong
role played by the welfare state in the East is, as mentioned earlier, a product of history.
Even today, the percentage of jobs in the public sector is higher in the East (Franz and
Steiner, 2000). For this reason, the total public consumption prole mainly diers for
children of school age, where the value for the East exceeds the value for the West by
about 3,000 euros. For all other age groups, the nominal values are comparable.
To construct the lifecycle decit, we add labor income to our estimates. The proles
show the usual working life pattern, beginning with an increase at about age 18. The
peak ages dier, with the East reaching the highest values in the early forties, and the
peak in the West following some years later. On average, Easterners earn on average 7,000
euros per capita per year less than Westerners. Both of the proles decrease early, but the
slope in the Western prole is steeper, whereas in the East, a higher share of the elderly
participate in alternative programs, such as partial retirement.
11Figure 4 presents the normalized lifecycle decit for East and West Germany in 200310.
The surplus period starts at age 27 in both regions, and it ends by age 56 in the East, two
years earlier than in the West. This period is shorter and the surplus is higher across all
age groups. The lifecycle decits for all of the dependent age groups in the East exceed the
decits in the West by about 10 percentage points. The values are even higher for the age
groups attending school in the East. As wages are lower in the East, a 10-year-old in that
part of Germany consumes 74 percent of the average income of people aged 30-49; while in
the West the corresponding share is only 47 percent. A similar trend can be seen for the
elderly population: a 70-year-old person in the East consumes 79 percent of the average
income of a prime-age adult, compared with 70 percent in the West. Over the age of 80
East German pensioners consume more than 90 percent (relative to a prime-age adult's
income), versus only around 80 percent in the West. The gap narrows only for the oldest
old, mainly due to the increased importance among this age group of public transfers,
including health care and long-term care, and a relative decrease in private consumption.
Focusing only on the normalized lifecycle decit for private consumption minus labor
income (while disregarding public consumption), Eastern and Western proles are almost
identical. The main driving force of the higher decit in the East is public consumption,
which was raised intentionally at the beginning of the 1990s to allow for a more rapid con-
vergence (with especially large amounts devoted to building a comparable infrastructure)
of the two parts of the country. Since then, expenditures have been growing, rather than
declining.
Upon examining the surplus period, we nd an interesting, and almost similar pattern
in the East and in the West in the age range 27 to 40, although the Eastern prole is
more volatile, and not as smooth as its Western counterpart. This is presumably due to
the disruption and gaps in the employment biography that occurred more frequently in
the East, especially in the years directly after reunication, when many individuals had to
change jobs (Dornbusch et al., 1992). Although the NTA show a cross-section, the prole
of ages 30 to 45 in Figure 4 might appear to indicate that the gap between the two regions
narrows for the younger cohorts, especially concerning labor market issues. After age 45,
we observe a sharp increase in the lifecycle decit in the East. This is due to the high
transfer dependency of the elderly in the East, as shown in Figure 2. The lifecycle decit
on an individual basis diers substantially. Whereas in the former FRG, the LCD adds
up to 2,907 euros per capita, the value for the former GDR area amounts to 4,488 euros.
If we multiply the LCD with the age structure, the lifecycle decit for Germany totals
to 265 billion euros. This is the part of consumption that is not paid for by earnings or
income from self-employment. The Eastern share of the decit is 28 percent (75.5 billion,
or 22.8 percent of Eastern GDP), even though only 20 percent of the population lives in
10The LCD is normalized to the labor income of a prime-age adults income between 30 to 49.





























































Figure 4: The normalized lifecycle decits for East and West Germany, 2003
Source: EVS 2003, National Accounts 2003, author's own calculations
the former GDR.
The higher lifecycle decit for the East, together with the knowledge that the Eastern
part of the country is more dependent on transfers, points to the crucial role of the
public sector. The decomposition of public transfer inows is pictured in Figure 5.
Pensions follow the same age prole, though they are a little higher in the East, because
virtually everyone in that part of the country was employed prior to reunication. Long
working histories and higher participation rates for women compensate for lower wages.
Unemployment benets and the basic social security prole increase with age, and are
twice as high in the East. Other forms of social security consist of family benets, such
as maternity leave and child allowances. The amount per capita for the two regions is
similar, with only the peak age diering, due to the younger age at family formation in
the East.
Figure 6 compares the total transfer in- and outows. Per capita total public inows
are approximately comparable, with slightly higher values in the East. For younger ages,
in-kind transfers for education are important, while the elderly receive public pensions.
Extensive social security expenditures transferred to the East cannot be supported on the
basis of the per capita inow prole. The main dierence appears on the public transfer
outow side. The revenues of government are highly dependent on paid employment. The
main sources are labor and income taxes and social contributions; together, they constitute
two-thirds of total revenues. As wages are lower and unemployment rates are higher in
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Figure 5: Public transfer inows for East and West 2003
Source: EVS 2003, National Accounts 2003, author's own calculations
the East, the public transfer outows are well below the Western numbers, and are thus
the net public transfers. The dierence adds up to more than 5,000 euros per capita for
a 45- to 50-year-old individual. Aggregating the public transfer outows (128 billion) and
inows (in-kind: 89 billion euros, and cash 106 billion euros), we observe that the social
security budget in the East comes up 67 billion euros short. In contrast, the decit for the
West amounts to only 8.5 billion euros. The direct annual ows amounted to 20 billion
euros in the past and are of the same magnitude even today. Indirect ows crossing the
former border are more than three times the direct ows. Although the \Solidarpakt II"
fund will gradually melt o and expire in 2019, the indirect ows are of a permanent
nature.
Private transfers complete the rst part of the age reallocations. In both parts of
Germany, private transfers are downward, from the old to the young. Until around age
30, people are net recipients. The inows for Western children and younger adults are
about 15 percent higher than for their Eastern compatriots, as their private consumption
is higher. When net private transfers turn negative, they remain especially high during
the stage of parenthood, and are negligible at about age 60. Thereafter, the transfers
again increase when individuals reach the phase of grandparenthood. The ows of private
transfers between prime-age adults are higher in the West, as dependent spouses need
nancial assistance more frequently. The strict downward ow of private transfers in
both regions is especially surprising, as East German pensioners rely almost exclusively
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Figure 6: Public transfer in- and outows for East and West 2003
Source: EVS 2003, National Accounts 2003, author's own calculations
on public pensions, with assets playing a minor role role in their portfolios. Nonetheless,
the percentage amount transferred to the next generation is comparable. Private transfers
are imputed from the EVS microsurvey. By denition, inows have to match the outows.
Total private transfers add up to 332 billion euros in the West and to 63 billion euros in
the East. The dierence per capita is about 1,400 euros.
In the remaining part of this section, we will examine the three main stages of the life-
cycle separately. The income sources presented so far include labor income from earnings
and self-employment, as well as public and private transfers. In addition, the importance
of asset-based reallocations for each age group will be presented, although they are mainly
of concern for the elderly.
Children
We will start with the rst stage of the human lifecycle: namely, how the needs of
children are nanced. Figure 8 presents in- and outows for \Max Mustermann" (the
German equivalent of \John Doe") in the East and the West for three stages over the
synthetic lifecycle11. For the young, the state plays a more important role in the East,
with half of consumption being nanced by the family, and the other half by the state
(in the West, it is 60 percent to 40 percent). Assets do not play a crucial role in this age
group, as it is assumed that only the household head possesses any wealth. Transfers to
the average child on a per capita basis are almost the same in both regions, and amount
11Please note that the estimates are cross-sectional.
15to slightly over 270,000 euros. Transfers of this amount are given to a child over a 20-year
period. In the East, the transfers from the government are even slightly higher than the
private transfers, while in the West, private transfers dominate. This is mainly due to the
fact that private consumption is higher in the West, and the share of children is higher as
well. As a percentage share of the labor income of an average 20-59-year-old, the transfers
to children are comparable in the two regions (East: 16 percent, West: 14 percent).
Adults
In a welfare state that provides education (and health care) for the young, and public
pensions and health care for the elderly, the working age population faces a double burden.
They not only have to support their own children ant the elderly; they are also supposed
to save for their own retirement, especially in the wake of the latest pension reforms in
Germany.
On a per capita basis, private transfers of working-age individuals as a percentage of
labor income do not dier between East and West, and amount to about eight percent
of labor income. As the private transfer inows for the average child are twice as high,
we nd that two prime-age adults pay for one child. The dramatic decline in the TFR
in recent decades reduces the burden of the working-age generations. Until the 1970s, a
couple had to support at least two children. Today, with many couples having just one
child, and a high percentage of women remaining childless, an increasing number of prime-
age adults make transfers to children only via the public sector. The double burden for
the working-age individual is mainly imposed by the government, which also forces them
to pay for the elderly. Outows of public transfers are about three times higher for West
German individuals.
Asset income - including all kinds of capital income, and for example the imputed
rental value of owner-occupied housing - of a prime age adult in the West is about 10
times higher than in the East. The shape of the asset-based reallocation prole (asset
income minus savings) is similar in the two regions (Figure 7), and tends to be low for
individuals until around age 50. We then observe a sharp increase until around age 65.
Then income starts to decrease moderately, but remains positive until the last observation
at age 90. However, the curve in the East is shifted to a lower level, producing negative
and more volatile values up to about age 45. Over the same ages, individuals in the West
have positive estimates. That is probably due to the fact that, while East Germans save
a portion of their income, but they do not have considerable capital transfer inows, as is
the case in the West.
The elderly
The dierences in income sources are most pronounced for the elderly. In particular,
the importance of assets relative to public transfers varies in the two parts of Germany,
and is an artifact of history. After World War II, when West Germany was developing a
























Figure 7: Asset-based reallocations, East and West 2003
Source: EVS 2003, National Accounts 2003, author's own calculations






































































































































Figure 8: Financing the LCD: Max Mustermann alias John Doe for East (left) and West
(right) in 2003
Source: author's own calculations based on German NTA estimates
17functioning market economy, the East was designed as a state-owned, centrally planned
economy. Because socialist ideology did not allow for a high dierentiation of wages (Franz
and Steiner, 2000), wages were similar for all individuals. While GDR citizens did not
have sucient income to save, the egalitarian provision of public pensions made saving for
retirement unnecessary. Homeownership rates also varied greatly between the East and
West. In the East, two types of homeownership existed: socialist property and individual
property. Rents were xed, and due to disincentives to owning a home imposed by the
government, homeownership decreased from 62 percent in 1971 to 41 percent in 1989
(Ebinger, 2005). Today, 25 percent of housing in the East and 40 percent of housing in
the West is owner-occupied (Ibid.).
Table 2 illustrates the income sources used to nance the retirement of the elderly in
East and West Germany over time. It shows the relationship of family transfers, public
transfers, and asset returns for Germans aged 65 and above in aggregate values for two
points in time. As can also be seen in Figure 8, the table shows that the elderly realize
negative values for private transfers, which means that they are net givers. Regardless of
the size of public transfers, German pensioners still redistribute a share of their income
to the succeeding generations. Unfortunately, the proles are aggregates, so it is unclear
whether inter-vivos transfers are given to their children or grandchildren. In percentage
terms, the dierence between the two regions is small, which is in line with Kohli et al.
(2006a).
The extent to which assets and public transfers are used to nance retirement diers
substantially between the East and the West. In the East, public transfers make up to
slightly more than 85 percent of retirement income, compared to two-thirds in the West.
The public transfer inows per capita are even higher for an East German individual,
which is mainly due to the higher public pensions per capita. Pension entitlements are
greater among East Germans as a result of their long working histories, and the very high
female labor force participation rates in the East before 1990.
Assets play a more important role in the West (40 percent) than in the East (20
percent), and include capital and interest income. Capital income includes the operating
surplus of corporations and NPISHs, the operating surplus of households, and the capital
share of mixed income and taxes on production. This inclusive approach taken by the
NTA accounts for the dierences in the relative importance assigned to assets, relative to
other studies12. Eastern Germans invest in bonds and stocks at lower rates than West
Germans. The same holds true for life insurance contracts (B orsch-Supan and Eymann,
2002).
Table 2 also includes information about the changes that occurred between 1993 and
12Reil-Held (2002) found that 80 percent of income in the West consists of public transfers, compared
to NTA estimates of 66 percent.
182003. It is noteworthy that the role of assets for the elderly doubled in the East within
10 years. After reunication, their share amounted to only seven percent; while 10 years
later, it was about 20 percent. The percentage of income transferred to the next generation
slightly increased in the East, whereas it decreased in the West. Assets already played a
signicant role for the Western elderly in 1993. Nevertheless, in both regions, the lion's
share of income is redistributed from the public sector, although the share is decreasing
in both regions.
Table 2: The income sources of the elderly over time
Region and Year Public Transfers Assets Private Transfers
East 2003 85.2 % 20.5 % -5.7 %
West 2003 65.1 % 40.8 % -6.9 %
East 1993 98.5 % 4.2 % -2.7 %
West 1993 79.2 % 33.4 % -10.3 %
Source: various sources, author's own calculations
Having discussed the importance of the income sources over the lifecycle for the East
and West separately, we now address the question of how population aging will aect the
transfer system in the future.
4 The impact of population aging for the transfer system
The aging of the population is of major concern in Germany, as it is among the countries
that are farther along in the demographic transition. For decades, the fertility rates have
been very low, and have been accompanied by increases in life expectancy. In the East,
population aging is even more pronounced than in the West, as outmigration of young
people has increased the pace of aging. According to Heiland (2004), there were two
outmigration waves. The rst wave occurred directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, when 3.7 percent of the population from the former GDR emigrated. Until the
mid-1990s, the annual outmigration rates were about one percent, and then rose again
in the late 1990s, hitting a peak of 1.64 percent outmigration in 2001 (Heiland, 2004, p.
176). While the rst wave was mainly due to the uncertainty of future events, the second
wave can be attributed to economic developments. The people who left the East were
mainly young skilled adults, and a higher proportion were female (Kempe, 1999; Hunt,
2000; Mai, 2004). These emigrants left behind a population who were farther along on the
aging trajectory.
Figure 9 shows the dependency ratios for East and West Germany from 1950 to 2050.
In the middle of the last century, we nd that the youth dependency ratio was higher than



























Youth dependency ratio (0−14)
Old age dependency ratio (60+)
Total dependency ratio



























Youth dependency ratio (0−14)
Old age dependency ratio (60+)
Total dependency ratio
Figure 9: Dependency ratios 1950-2050, East (left) and West (right)
Source: author's own calculations based on population estimates (Federal Statistical
Oce)
the old age dependency ratio. The reversal of this relationship took place in the late 1970s
in the West, and about 10 years later in the East. Since then, the youth dependency ratio
has declined, and has reached a stable value of around 20 percent. At the same time, the
old age dependency ratio has been increasing rapidly, and is predicted to reach 80 percent
in the East and 70 percent in the West in 2030.
Figure 10 depicts the economic support ratios for the two regions of interest over the
same time period. The age proles of consumption, income, and transfers are assumed
to stay constant over time. At the same time, the demography is developing in line with
the 12th coordinated population projection (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009). The shapes
of the two curves are similar, but the East is always lower than the West. Population
aging will aect the East more severely, and the support ratio will drop below 60 percent
in 2020. Based on the NTA estimates, we can assume that the interstate ows that go
indirectly from the West to the East through the social security system will continue to
make up a substantial proportion of the income of East Germans long after the direct
ows to the East end in 2019.
In Table 3, we show the results of a very simple static experiment. We use the con-
sumption and income proles of the NTA in 2003 to predict the gap between consumption
and labor income in the future for the young and the elderly. This experiment only takes
into account the demographic changes.13. Thus, the lifecycle decit will increase in both
regions over time. The increase is more pronounced in the West than in the East, as the
East is already aging quite rapidly, while the West will experience the same phenomenon
at an accelerating pace. The values for 2020 and 2030 are quite high, as the baby boomers
reach retirement age. The lifecycle decit of the young will decrease substantially over the
13The demography develops according to the 12th coordinated population projection (Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 2009)
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Figure 10: Economic support ratios and total dependency ratios for East and West 2003
Source: Federal Statistical Oce, NTA estimates, author's own calculations
next 20 years, as a lower number of children will require nancial support. At the same
time, the lifecycle decit of the elderly is expected to develop in the opposite direction.
This increase will be entirely due to the greater number of elderly people using public
health care. Currently, we do not expect the lifecycle decit to increase rapidly for the
oldest old in Germany, as it is the case in Japan or the US. If the per capita lifecycle
decit behaves like this in the future, the values will be even higher. Another reason why
the lifecycle decit is growing is that a decreasing number of people of working age will
produce a surplus.
The income sources available to the dependent age groups are likely to change under
these conditions. As the number of people of working age rapidly declines, government
inows are likely to decrease. With fewer public resources available, the share of private
transfers for children is likely to increase. At the same time, the elderly will have to
cope with decreasing public pensions, and will therefore have to decrease consumption or
increase savings.
The demand for wealth to nance the coming lifecycle decit is growing rapidly. In the
future, the nancing strategy of social security will need to be reformed. Social security
contributions from labor only are going to decrease, since a smaller number of people will
be of working age. Hence, it will be necessary to reduce the burden on labor, and to look
for alternative tax revenues, such as taxes on consumption.
21Table 3: The lifecycle decit of children and the elderly in comparison
Variable and Year East West
Total LCD 2003 75.5 bn 189.7 bn
Total LCD 2020 95.1 bn 250.1 bn
Total LCD 2030 105.7 bn 330.7 bn
Children 2003 44.4 bn 193.6 bn
Children 2020 34.3 bn 149.9 bn
Children 2030 31.2 bn 143.1 bn
Elderly 2003 59.6 bn 250.4 bn
Elderly 2020 78.6 bn 301.3 bn
Elderly 2030 88.6 bn 358.8 bn
Source: various sources, author's own calculations
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented estimates of income sources in East and West Germany,
and have examined their importance in nancing consumption at each stage of life. These
income sources include labor income, public transfers, private transfers, and assets. The
relative importance of these income sources over the lifecycle diers by age and region. As
expected, the proles vary with respect to the role of the state between the two \countries".
If we look only at private consumption, the proles resemble one another. This means
that, relative to their labor income, East Germans do not consume disproportionately
more than West Germans. As soon as public consumption is included, however, the gap
widens substantially. The shapes of the proles resemble each other, but the lifecycle
decit reaches higher levels in the East. This trend is especially pronounced for the people
in education.
On a nominal per capita basis, the public transfer inows are not much higher for
East than for West Germans. Nevertheless, the net public transfers are far below the
German average. The lower employment levels and lower wages in the East result in both
a transfer surplus period that is eight years shorterin the East, and in transfer outows that
are substantially lower. The annual ows from West to East amount to about 70 billion
euros redistributed through the social security system. This gure is seven times the size
of the direct ows of 2003. Whereas the direct transfer ows to the East will expire in
2019, the ows through the social security system are of a more permanent nature, and will
not decrease substantially due to the unfavorable age structure of the Eastern population.
Generally, we nd that the importance of public transfers in nancing consumption is
higher in the East for all dependent age groups, but especially for the elderly.
Private transfers move strictly downwards to the younger generations, and, as a share
22of income, pensioners in the East and the West transfer approximately the same amounts.
The amounts transferred in the East increased from 1993 to 2003, which indicates that
East German pensioners are feeling better o after reunication, and are able to give a
share of their resources to their children and grandchildren. At the same time, the reverse
is true for the West. Here the amount transferred to the younger generations has almost
halved, which probably reects pension cuts over this period.
The main dierence we observe is in the role played by of assets in the portfolios of
elderly people. While assets make up to 39 percent of the income of West Germans over
the age of 65, the corresponding share in the East is only 16 percent. This is, of course,
explained by the fact that the elderly in the East were unable to build up capital stock
in the former GDR. In addition, homeownership rates are lower in the East, which has
resulted in lower shares of imputed rental value for owner-occupied housing. Over the
time period 1993 to 2003, we can observe signs of convergence. Whereas in 1993, assets
played virtually no role in the sources of income of the East German elderly, the share
increased by 10 percentage points over the decade. During the same time, the importance
of assets in the West only grew by 7 percentage points.
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